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Customary international law is universal in its reach.' It is not subject to
control by a few actors in the international legal process,2 and it binds all
participants in international and non-international armed conflicts to the extent
that it is applicable to such conflicts.'
For example, insurgents operating during an armed conflict not of an
international character who are nationals of a state that has not ratified the 1949
Geneva Conventions (a rare state, such as Taiwan) are bound by relevant
customary humanitarian law reflected, for example, in common Article 3 of the
Conventions.4 Thus, they are subject to prosecution for violations of common
Article 3's prohibitions-technically, not as violations of treaty law as such, but
as violations of the customary law reflected in common Article 3. Further, it
is widely recognized that common Article 3 reflects customary international
law,5 as a new study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
demonstrates.6
That treaties can later reflect customary law and bind nonsignatory
nationals was recognized, for example, by the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg7 with respect to German nationals despite the refusal of Germany
to ratify the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV8 prior to the outbreak of World
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1. See, e.g., JORDANJ. PAUST, INTERNATIONALLAw AS LAW OFTHEUNITED STATES 4,7-8,22-26
n.14, 420-23, 443-46 (2d ed., 2003).
2. See, e.g., id., at 5, 22-26 n.14.
3. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 813-14, 816-18, 820-22 (2005).
4. See, e.g., id. at 816.
5. Id. at 816-17 n.19.
6. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 299, 306-19 (2005).
7. See International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947) [hereinafter Military Tribunal].
8. Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.
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War U1. Moreover, a general participation clause that limited the treaty's reach
to conflicts between signatory states became irrelevant once the rules mirrored
in the treaty became customary international law,9 which is universal in its
reach. The same reach can occur regarding other customary laws of war despite
attempted limitations concerning treaties through use of unilateral reservations
or understandings, since the effect of such treaty-based limitations are obviated
once the rights, duties and protections become customary international law.'"
Further, it did not matter that Germany objected, was a major participant in
war-making, and was otherwise a specially affected state. Customary
international law is based in general and dynamic patterns of opinio juris and
practice," but when a customary norm comes into existence it is universally
applicable.
With respect to Geneva law, it is important to note that common Article
1 of the Conventions, which reflects customary law, requires that signatories
and their nationals "respect and.., ensure respect" for the Conventions "in all
circumstances."' 2 Thus, customary and treaty-based Geneva obligations flow
erga omnes-that is, not merely to enemies, but also to all other signatories
and, as customary obligatio erga omnes, to all of humankind and without
putative excuses based on alleged necessity, reciprocity, or reprisals. 3
Customary international law also provides relevant rights for all
participants in international or non-international armed conflicts whether or not
they are nationals of a state, nation, or belligerent that has ratified a treaty
reflecting the same rights. With respect to treaty-based rights, it is worth
emphasizing that the nationals of a state that has ratified the 1949 Geneva
Conventions are bound by and have numerous express and implied rights under
such treaties.' 4 It does not matter that such nationals are also members of an
entity that is not a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent-such as a private
security corporation operating in Iraq, a lawyers' bar association, or al Qaeda.'5
Nationals of signatories to the Geneva Conventions, such as Saudi and Afghan
nationals, have duties and rights under Geneva law applicable to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Customary international law, which is universal in its reach, also provides
states various competencies mirrored, for example, in Hague and Geneva law,
9. Military Tribunal, supra note 7; see also Paust, supra note 3, at 819 n.28.
10. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 822-23.
11. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 3-7.
12. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention].
13. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 814-16.
14. See, e.g., id. at 814, 816-20, 829 n.62.
15. Id. at 829.
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whether or not persons under control or enemies in battle are nationals of
signatories to such treaties. Thus, for example, the customary competence to
detain certain persons under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security
of a state when reasonably necessary for security purposes that is reflected in
Articles 5, 42-43, and 78 of the Geneva Civilian Convention 6 can be exercised
also with respect to nonsignatory nationals. Detention of non-prisoners of war,
of course, is subject to required review of the propriety of detention. 7
Customary state competencies to detain prisoners of war 8 that are reflected in
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 9 also apply with respect to
nonsignatory nationals.
Customary international law also provides a necessary background as an
interpretive aid. As recognized internationally in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties2 and domestically by various decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, customary international law is a relevant and
necessary background for interpretive purposes, resolving ambiguities, and
filling in gaps.2 ' Such a role of customary law is all the more important with
respect to normsjus cogens or peremptory norms that preempt other norms with
respect to rights and duties.22 An example is the customary and jus cogens
prohibition of torture as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 23 such
as the stripping of persons naked for interrogation purposes, the use of dogs for
interrogation and even terror purposes, and hooding for interrogation
purposes--each of which is a patently illegal tactic that was authorized and
ordered in memos by Secretary Rumsfeld and others as part of a common plan
for use in Guantanamo and even in Iraq. 24 These were clearly illegal tactics
under customary laws of war and nonderogable human rights law, and their
authorization and use can lead to criminal and civil responsibility for
16. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power To Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503, 512-14 (2003).
17. See, e.g., id. at 507-10 (judicial review under human rights law), 514 (review under the Geneva
Civilian Convention).
18. See, e.g., id. at 510-12; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,520 (2004).
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug., 12 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21. Id. art. 31(3)(c); See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 12-13,370,388 n.64, 435-37 (concerning
such a use of customary international law in U.S.).
22. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 48 n.57, 164-65 n.127, 370-71, 376-77.
23. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 821-22.
24. See, e.g., id. at 834-36, 838-50.
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perpetrators, conspirators, complicitors, and those guilty of the separate offense
of dereliction of duty.25
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski has stated in an August 3, 2005
interview with Professor Marjorie Cohn that she saw a Rumsfeld authorization
on a pole outside at Abu Ghraib: "It was a memorandum signed by Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, authorizing a short list, maybe 6 or 8 techniques: use of
dogs; stress positions; loud music; deprivation of food," and so forth, adding
"[a]nd then a handwritten message over to the side that appeared to be the same
handwriting as the signature . . . said 'Make sure this happens' with two
exclamation points. '"26 On Frontline on October 18, 2005, she also stated that
Major General Miller came to Iraq to GTMOize interrogation tactics.27
Another example of the use of custom involves the incorporation of
customary human rights to due process into common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. This occurs expressly through the phrase "all the judicial
guarantees recognized by civilized nations. 28  Today, these include the
minimum human rights to due process reflected in Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,29 which in turn are
mirrored in the Rules or Statutes of the ICTY,30 the ICTR,31 and the ICC32- but
which are seriously lacking in present rules for the military commissions at
Guantanamo.33
Customary international law can also shift limitations in the Geneva
Conventions or override them. An example is the recognized applicability of
rights and duties set forth in common Article 3, not merely during insurgencies,
but also during belligerencies and wars among nations and/or states such as the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps more appropriately, the rights and duties
reflected in common Article 3 are now a minimum set of customary rights and
25. See, e.g., id. at 852-55, 862 n. 198.
26. Marjorie Cohn, Abu Ghraib General Lambastes Bush Administration, TRUTHOUT:
PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/082405Z.shtml (last visited Feb. 15,2006).
27. Frontline Interview with Janis Karpinski, Gulf War Veteran and Army Reservist, (Aug. 5,2005),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/karpinski.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2006).
28. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 16, at 511 n.27, 514.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
30. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), arts.
20-21, S.C. Res. 827, Annex (May 25, 1993).
31. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), arts. 19-20,24-25, S.C.
Res. 955, Annex (Nov. 8, 1994).
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 55, 66-67, 81-83, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9 (July 17, 1998).
33. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 677-90 (2002).
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duties that are also applicable in international armed conflicts.34 Moreover,
customary and universally applicable human rights apply during war and
provide at least the same or similar rights and restraints.35
Another area of customary law is worth highlighting-the immunity of
combatants from prosecution for conduct that is lawful under the customary
laws of war.36 Interrelated is the customary definition of "combatant," which
hinges on membership in the armed forces of a belligerent, nation, or state
during an armed conflict.37 Attempts to change that test can be dangerous for
U.S. and other military personnel.38 Of course, mere insurgents have no
combatant status or combatant immunity under customary law.39
Customary international law can also have effects domestically.4 For
example, when a treaty is not directly incorporable but the customary laws of
war can be, customary laws of war can produce direct effects in a domestic
legal process.4' In the United States, the customary laws of war are binding on
the President and all persons within the Executive branch.42 There have also
been recognitions of the primacy of the laws of war over federal statutes.43
34. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 816-17 n.19.
35. See, e.g., id. at 820-22. Under the U.N. Charter, human rights would also prevail over
inconsistent law of war treaties. See U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56, 103. Human rightsjus cogens would also
prevail over more ordinary international law.
36. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 330-33 (2003).
37. Id. at 328-330.
38. See, e.g., id. at 332-35.
39. Id. at 327-29.
40. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-16.
41. See, e.g., id. at 10-12, 15,170-73,293-96 n.503,370-71,489,492-94,499-501 n.25,507-08
n.87.
42. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 856, 858-61.
43. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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